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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF ALBERT J. DUQUESNE,

Dece.ased.
:MARGUERITE HORNBERG and
JEANNETTE RADKE·,
Appellants,
vs.
ANDREW J. SCHERER,
Respondent.

Case No.

12908

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Omitting the various innuendos and arguments contained in Appellants' statement of facts, a simple statement follows.
This is a contest to determine the heirs of Albert
J. DuQuesne, deceased. Appellants Jeannette Radke and
Marguerite Hornberg claim as children of a half-sister
of deceased, and Respondent Andrew J. Scherer appears
on behalf of the class of thirteen first cousins of deceased..
The trial before Judge Gordon R. Hall was on separate motions for summary judgment, each based on a
stipulation of facts. (R. 172) The stipulated facts may
be condensed to these conclusions:
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1. Eugene DuQuesne married Catherine Scherer at
Chicago, Illinois on December 31, 1877. (R. 31) Albert
DuQuesne was a child of this marriage, being born on
April 28, 1884, at Chicago, Illinois. (R. 32)
2. While still married to Catherine DuQuesne, Eugene Duquesne lived in Chicago, Illinois in an adulterous
relationship with Carrie Brike. (R. 47) Eugenia DuQuesne was 'the illegitimate child of Eugene DuQuesne
and Carrie Brike, being born at Chicago, Illinois on
December 31, 1892. (R. 35) In a separate maintenance
and support suit in 1908, Catherine alleged that Eugenia
was living with Eugene and Carrie at Chicago. (R. 47)
In enforcing a support order in that separate maintenance matter on November 20, 1910 Catherine testified
thait Eugene then was her husband. (R. 110)

3. By his answer in the separate maintenance and
support suit Eugene did not deny that he was still
legally married to Catherine, and he acknowledged that
his daughter lived with him. (R. 76) Eugenia was shown
as his daughter by the Chicago, Illinois Census Report
of 1900. (R. 34)
4. Eugene died at Chicago, Illinois, on September
14, 1921. (R. 36) Catherine died at Chicago, Illinois, on
November 9, 1924. (R. 33)
5. Appellants Radke and Hornberg are the tw.o
children of Eugenia DuQuesne Boyte, who died at Chi·
cago, Illinois, on February 29, 1924. (R. 41) Appellants
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claim as heirs of Albert DuQuesne under Section 74-4-5
(4) UCA.
6. Respondent Andrew J. Scherer is one of the
class of first cousins of Albert DuQuesne, who claim as
heirs under Section 74-4-5 (6) UCA.
The stipulated facts show that the situs of decedent's
property is Utah, where the law of succession is Section
74-4-5 UCA. The domicile of Eugenia, the illegitimate
half-sister of decedent, and also of her mother, Carrie,
and of her putative father, Eugene, was for each clearly
Illinois. The law of status of Illinois at all times relevant
to this matter was stipulated to be the following portion
of Chapter 3, Paragraph 12, Illinois Revised Statutes
1969; entitled Illegitimates:
"An illegitimate child is heir of his mother
and of any maternal ancestor, and of any person
from whom his mother might have inherited, if
living; and the lawful issue of any illegitimate
person shall represent such person and take by
descent, any estate which the parent would have
taken, if living. An illegitimate child whose parents intrr-marry and who is acknowledged by the
fathl'r as the father's child shall be considered
legitimate." (Emphasis added) (R.174)
There is no proof of any marriage of Eugene to
Carrie, and even common law marriage to Carrie was
not possible, as there is no proof of any divorce from
Catherine, who outlived Eugene.

J ndge Hall granted the Respondent's motion and
denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment, hold-
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mg (1) that 74-4-10 UCA 1953 is a legitimation statuteI
(2) that the law of the domicile of the illegitimate and
of her fa:ther, that is, Illinois, should determine the
status of legitimacy, and (3) that the case law as cited
by Respondent's memoranda, particularly In re Forney's
Estate (Ntvada) and Popp v. Roth (Utah), infra, should
govern in this matter. (R. 240)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
74-4-10 UCA 1953 IS A LEGITIMATION STATUTE FOR
INHERITANCE BY A UTAH ILLEGITIMATE CHILD FROM
A UTAH FATHER.

The crux of this case is the legal effect of 74-4-10
UCA 1953:
"74-4-10. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN INHERITANCE BY. - Every illegitimate child
is an heir of the person who acknowledges himself
to be the father of such child, and in all cases is
an heir of his mother; and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the
same manner as if he had been born in lawful
wedlock. The issue of all marriages null in law,
or dissolved by divorce are legitimate."

The Appellants contend that the statute should give
unlimited inheritance to and through illegitimates from
and through both the mother and the father. This contention would avoid all consideration of legHimacy and
would allow full inheritance to, from and through any
illegitimate kin.
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The Hespondent contends, and Judge Hall held, that
74-4-10 UCA 1953 means just what it says, that every
illegrtimate is ( l) an heir of his mother and (2) an heir
of the father who legitimates the child. It is a statute
of inheritance, limited to succession from the mother, and
it ii; the Utah statute of legitimation for inheritance
through the father. Only the direct inheritance by a child
from the parent's estate is provided, either by the illegitimate directly from the mother, or by legitimation by
the father.
The fin;t premise m all succession cases involving
illegitimates is that under the common law the illegitimate was filius m1lliu.s and had no rights of inheritance.
10 Am. Jitr. 2d 948, Sec. 14G; 24 A.L.R. 571; 48 A.L.R. 2d
7G2. The only rights of inheritance are those specifically
provided by statute. 10 Am. Jur. 2d 948, Sec. 146. The
Utah Court in Rohicer v. District Court, 41 Utah 279,
125 P. 671 (1912), and Mansfield v. Neff, 43 Utah 258,
134 P. 1HiO ( 1913), reviewed the history of the Utah statnte (now 74-4-10 UCA) granting right of inheritance to
illegitimate:;. Those cases reaffirmed the general rule
that under the common law an illegitimate could not inherit and then held that the statute granting rights of
inheritance should be strictly construed, with only those
rights of inheritance existing which were specifically
granted by statute. The Rohwer and Mansfield cases involved 'the kgitimation and inheritance of Utah domiciled
ehiklren.
Re:,;pondcnt agrees that the law of the situs deter-
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mmes the descent of property of an intestate, who the
heirs are and what interest they take. 23 Arn. Jur. 2d 766
I
Sec. 19. Then, in determining whether a particular
person is a member of a class permitted to inherit, the
law of the status, being the law of the domicile of the
person effected, prevails. 10 Arn. Jur. 2d 953, Sec. 152.
The question then is - what rights of inheritance
were given by statute and to whom as illegitimates in
Respondent agrees that under 74-4-10UCA1953 illegitimates can inherit from their mother because of the
specific language of the statute. The cases cited by Appellants' brief (p. 23), Hudson v. Reed, 259 Ala. 340,
66 So. 2d 990 (1953); State v. Chavez, 42 N.1\I. 569, 82
P.2d 900 (1938); and Griindy v. Hadfield, 16 R.I. 579,
18 A. 196 (1889), all involve inheritance by an illegitimate
from collaterals through their mother under specific
statutory provision. They are not pertinent to the DuQuesne facts, where any inheritance by Appellants must
be through the father of the illegitimate.
As to inheritance from the father, "The common
law rule that a bastard cannot inherit from its natural
father continues to govern the rights of an illegitimate
to inherit from its father in jurisdictions where no such
right has been given by statute." 10 Arn. Jur. 2d 960,
Sec.158.
74-4-10 UCA 1953 gives the right of inheritance from
the father "who acknowledges himself to be the father "
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of the illegitimate. Acknowledgment by the father is
universally accepted as the principal means of change of
status of the illegitimate so as to inherit as the heir of
his father. 10 C.J.S. 55, Sec. 11; 24 A.L.R. 586. The
particular nature and form of the acknowledgment, if
required, depends on the statute granting the right.
In an attempt to torture 74-4-10 UCA 1953 into an
unlimited statute of succession for illegitimates, Appellants' brief (pages 5-8 and 22-23) quotes choice language
from Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 832 (1891) and In re Garr's
Estate, 31Utah57, 86 P. 757 (1906).

The Cope case determined tha;t the Utah Territorial
Act of 1852, allowing polygamous children to inherit from
the father, was constitutional. That law and its effect
ended with the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887 and was
never reinstated. All rights of inheritance of illegitimates
and legitimated persons in Utah were given by statute
by enactment of present 74-4-10 and 78-30-12 UCA 1953
in 1898.
The Garr case specifically held that under Section
2883, Revised Statutes of Utah 1898 (now 74-4-10 UCA
1953) a Utah domiciled child could be legitimated by
acknowledgment and had rights of inheritance from and
through the Utah father. The Utah Court refined the
question in the Gan case thus:
"Whether the children of Johnnie Garr, who
was the illegitimate son of John T. Garr, deceased,
can, under our statutes, inherit the decedent's estate; or, in other words, was Johnnie Garr leg£timated under the statute, so that he transmitted
1

1

8
inheritable blood to his
Id. at 763.

(Emphasis ours)

The Court answered its question thus:
"E'?-dently the intention was that illegitimate children should have vested in them inheritable blood and the right to inherit from the father
when acknowledged by him, in the same manne;
and to the same extent as if they had been born
legitimate." (Emphasis ours) Id. at 763.
The Garr case is the proof positive that a bastard can
inherit through his father only if provided by statute
and by legitimation. The real question in Ga.rr was as
to the sufficiency of facts constituting acknowledgment1
and it is so cited at 33 A.L.R. 2d 744 in an annotation setting forth what amounts to sufficient recognition under
statutes affecting the status or rights of illegitimates.
Garr is cited at 24 A.L.R. 588 under the category of
cases allowing inheritance by an illegitimate child from its
acknowledging father under limitation of statute.

In re Roberts Estate, 69 Utah 548, 256 P. 1068 (1927)
determined what proof of paternity and acknowledgment
was necessary for inheritance from the father under
Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, Sec. 6413 (now 74-4-10 UCA
1953). The case involved a Utah 'domiciled child and a
Utah domiciled father, whose statements alleged as acknowledgments were made in Utah.
In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 4G3, 5 P.2d 230 (1931)
followed the Roberts case in making acknowledgment a
jury question. Again a Utah father and child were involved.
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The Roberts and Newell cases both went to the sufficiency of proof of acknowledgment under the statute,
and they implement the Garr case in following the logical
and orderly rule of determination of status and legitimation by the law of the state of domicile of the father or
the child, which state certainly has the most significant
relationship to the person. This is the entire reason for
the rule of status in conflicts in laws. See Beale, Conflict
of Laws, Vol. 1, Sec. 1.8, p. 7.
Appellants' brief (P. 11) cites Pfeiffer v. Wright,
41 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1930) as a case under a statute
similar to 74-4-10 UCA 1953 involving succession by an
illegitimate without regard to status or legitimation. On
the contrary, Pfeiffer v. Wright as the main case reviewed at 73 A.L.R. 932 stands for the following proposition:
"The great weight of authorities either hold
or assume, for the purpose of the particular decision, tha:t the question whether a bastard has
acquired the status of legitimacy for the purpose
of inheriting or sharing in the distribution of
property in the state is to be determined not by the
law of the situs of the property, nor by that of the
domicil of the decedent as such, but by the personal law of the bastard." Id. P. 946.
1

The same general rules as to the law of the situs and
the law of the status are set out in 26A C.J.S. 521, Sec.

3:

"WherP at the time of death of decedent his
intestate estate is located in the state of his domicile, the law of such state will govern as to its
descent and distribution," and at P. 522:
1
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"Where the right of a person or a particula
class to _succeed to or inherit the estate of
person is made by statute to depend on his per.
sonal status, and such status is called in question
it is to be ascertained by the law of the
which creates the status, at least when such law
is not repugnant to the laws of the state in which
it is questioned."
The full statement of the rule of situs and status is
restated at 87 A.L,.R.2d 1289, Sec. 7:
"The law of the situs of the property determines what class of persons will inherit property
in that state, since that is a question of descent
and not of status, althoiigh the question whether
OJ particular person possesses the statns to bring
him within that class must, and ordinarily is, determined by the law governing his statils." (Emphasized portion was omitted by Appellants in
their brief, p. 16.)
Appellants' brief (pages 8-11) cites and quotes incidental language from Moen v. Moen, 16 S.D. 210, 92
N.W. 13 (1902); Van Horn v. Van Horn, 107 Iowa 247,
77 N.W. 846 (1899); In re Wehr's Estate, 96 Mont. 245,
29 P.2d 836 (1934); Blythe v. Ayers, 96 Cal. 532, 31 P.
915 (1882); and In re Loyd's Estate, 170 Cal. 85, 148 P.
522 (1915 ), as cases where the law of the situs determined
heirship irrespective of status. Each of these cases involved a situation where the situs of the decedent's property was in the same state as the domicile of the illegitima:te's father. In each instance there was a statute in
that same state of situs and of the father's domicile which
required legitimation by some form of acknowledgment
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or recognition. In each case the court held that the law
of status at the father's domicile controlled, and in each
case there was a thorough examination of the facts making acknowledgment for legitimation. In no one of the
cases was there a granting of succession without legitimation.
Appellants' brief (p. 18) cites McNamar:a v. McNarnarn, 303 Ill. 191, 135 N.E. 410 (1922); Fuhrhop v.
Austin, 385 Ill. 149, 52 N.E. 2d 267 (1943); and Stoltz
v. Doeing, 112 Ill. 235 ( 1885) under a quote which generally asserts the law of situs. McNamam and Fuhrhop
are cited at 87 A.L.R. 2d 1280 under the general rule
that the personal law of the child governs his status.
Note 16 at 87 A.L.R. 2d 1280 states that Hall v. Gabbert,
213 Ill. 208, 72 N.E. 806, cited by Appellants (App. Br. p.
10) as a situs case, is irreconcilable with the later Illinois
cases cited above and that although not overruled, the
Hall case actually applied the situs law to legitimate the
child. Stoltz is ref erred to at 87 A.L.R. 2d 1280 as a
case where the court refused to apply at the situs what
was apparently a law of inheritance of a foreign country.
None of these Appellants' cases are pertinent to their
claims of right of succession.
Blythe v. Ayers, In re Loyd's Estate, both supra, and
In re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643, 162
A.L.R. 606 ( 1945), are the leading California cases involving the question of status of illegitimates. See 15A C.J.S.
480, Sec. 14; 10 C.J.S. 51, Sec. 8; 24 A.L.R. 587; 10 Am.
Ju.r. 2d 948, Sec. 146; Beale, Conflict of Laws, Vol. 2, p.
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710, Sec. 139.3. In each case California was the situs of the
property and also the domicile of the father. The Blythe
and Loyd cases determined that the father's domicile
rather than the child's governed, and the Lund case held
that the father's continuing acts of acknowledgment
followed him :n his change of domicile to California. In
each case what constituted sufficient acknowledgment was
vital, and the California sta:tute was referred to as one
of legitimation and not inheritance, and the general
rule of status was recognized and followed.
The problems of the Blythe, Lund and Loyd cases do
not apply in DuQuesne. Eugenia, the illlegitimate, and her
father and mother were each and all domiciled in Illinois
and were subject to Illinois law. That law, Chapter 2, Par.
12, Illinois Revised Statittes, 1969, supra, required intermarriage of Eugene DuQuesne and Carrie Brike was not
possible, as Eugene was legally married to Catherine DuQuesne until his death. None of Eugenia, Eugene or
Carrie had any relationship to Utah or as far as the
record shows ever set foot in Utah, and the facts to
qualify Appellants as collateral heirs of the Utah decedent go back to the period from 1892 to 1921, all
having taken place in Illinois.
A logical and practical examination of 74-4-10 UCA
1953 requires a determination that the statute is one of
legitimation for inheritance, with the requisites of status
to be governed by the law of domicile of the father or the
child. It provides the means of legitimation for a Utah
domiciled child. To look to the status of a child or father
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domiciled elsewhere, the general rule of status must there
apply.
POINT II
THE LAW OF ILLINOIS, THE DOMICILE OF THE ILLEGITIMATE AND OF HER FATHER, SHOULD DETER:IIINE HER STATUS AND ANY RIGHTS OF SUCCESSION
UNDER UTAH LAW OF SITUS.

In re Forney's Estate, 43 Nev. 227, 184 P. 206, 186
P. G78, 24 A.L.R. 551 (1919) is on all fours with the DuQuesne facts and law question. The probate property
was in Nevada. The illegi timate child and her father were
domiciled in California, where the law of status required
that for le1:,ritirnation the child must be received into the
family of the father. The Nevada court held that the
California law of status governed, that proof of legi'timation under California law was lacking, and that the child
was thus not legitimated to take as heir in Nevada. The
Nevada court at 184 P. 206 restated the general rule of the
status, at; :set ont in Ross v. Ross, 129 l\:1ass. 243, 37 Am.
Rep. 322:
1

''It is a general principle that the status or
condition of a person, the relation in which he
stands to another person, and by which he is
llnalified or made capable to take certain rights in
the otlwr':s property, is fixed by the law of the
dornicilE•, and that this status and capacity are to
bP reco1:,rnized and upheld in every other state, so
far a:s they are not inconsistent with its own laws
and polic)'. Subject to this limitation, upon the
death of any man, the status of those who claim
succession or inheritance in his estate is to be

..
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?Y the law under which that status was
1

acqmred; his personal property is indeed to be
distributed according to the law of his domicile
at the time of his death, and his real estate descends according to the law of the place in which
it is situated; but, in either case, it is accordinrr
to those provisions of that law which
succession or inheritance of persons having such
a status."
The court in the Forney case stated at 186 P. 679:
"There can be only one proper state for the
legitimation of a child, and, if it is not legitimated
according according to the laws of that state, it is
not legitimated anywhere."
The Nevada court raised the interesting query -If
there were no property left in Nevada - would anyone
say that the California domiciled child was legitimated
under the more liberal Nevada law? The court answered
its query, saying: "Status does not depend upon the
existence of inheritable property, but the right to inherit
does depend upon the child's status." Id. p. 679
1

The general rule of status and the prevailing law
of domicile is set out as a general principle of law by the
text writers. Stimson, Conflict of Laws, page 140, states:
"The applicable law is that to which
were subject at the time of conduct or proceedrngs
alleged to have caused a legitimation."

Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, 2nd Ed., page 330 states:
"Legitimization of a natural child is governed
by the law of the domicile of the parent at the
1
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time of occurrence of the event upon which a claim
of legitimacy is based."

Beale, Conflict of Laws, Vol. 2, Sec.138.1, p. 704, states:
"Legitimacy being a domestic status, it must
on general principlef: be governed by the domicile
of the parties to it."
Also, at Sec. 304.1, p. 1033 :
"If a bastard is legitimized by the law of the
domicile, he may inherit, and if the law of the
domicile finds him illegitimate he may not inherit
even though by the law governing distribution he
would inherit." (Forney case, supra, cited)

The cases recognizing and applying the general rule
of status by law of domicile are reviewed in the annotations at 73 A.L.R. 964, 162 A.L.R. 626 and 87 A.L.R. 2d
1274. The rnle is stated at 87 A.L.R. 2d 1280 as follows:
"The courts in an overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions take the position that the question
whether a particular child has acquired the requisite status of legitimacy to bring him within
the class of persons who are permitted to inherit
b)· the 1aw of the situs is a question, not of descent
or distribution, but of personal status, and as such
is governed by the personal law of the child, and
'the existence or acquisition of a legitimate status
b)· the child's personal law will be given effect under the inheritance law of the situs (so long as
such !'('cognition does not violate the public policy
of tlH· forum or situs), as will the denial of such
status."
'l'lit· Forney case was followed and cited with full
appro,·al in In n: 8pano's Estate, 49 N.J. 263, 229 A.2d

,..
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645(1967) and In re Presley Estate, 113 Okla. 160, 24lJ
P. 89 (1924). In Presley the illegitimate child was born
in Tennessee, and the father acknowledged him there,
then moved to Oklahoma to live and die. The acknowl
edgment was sufficient under the Oklahoma law of
but insufficient under Tennessee law of status. The
Oklahoma court found the child illegitimate in Oklahoma
and excluded him from the Oklahoma estate.

Boale, Conflict of Laws, Vol. 2, Sec. 140.0, p. 711,
states:

"An acknowledgment can take effect only b)·
the law of domicile of the parent, and unless
parent with whom the legitimate relation is to be
established is domiciled in a state which permit1
such an act, the legitimation is not accomplished.''
Beale, Id., Sec. 304.1, p. 1033, states:
"If a bastard is legitimated by the proper law
(citing to Sec.140.1) he may inherit (citingto
Blythe v. Ayers, supra) and if the proper law
finds him illegitimate he may not inherit, even
though by the law governing diS'tribution he would
inherit." (citing to the Forney case, supra, and
to Eddie v. Eddie, 8 N.D. 376, 79 N.W. 856.)

78-30-12 UCA 1953, as the companion statute to
10 UCA 1953, provides for the adoption of an illlegitimate
by his father by "publicly acknowledging it as his
receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he'.s
married into his family, and otherwise treating it as if
it were 'a legitimate child ... " The Rohwer, llf ansfielJ
and Garr cases, supra, all involYed Utah domiciled cM
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dren, and each determined the sufficiency of the acknowledgment of the Utah domiciled father under this sta:tute.
The purpose of 78-30-12 UCA 1953 is clearly that of
legitimation, and it was never intended to have any effect
outside of Utah on children and fathers not domiciled in
Utah.
The general rule is stated at 153 A.L.R. 199:

"It is the general rule that the status of a
child as an adopted or legitimated child for purposes of inheritance of property is governed, not
by the law of the situs of the property, but by the
law of 'the state in which the adoption takes place
or the state where the father was domiciled at the
time the acts alleged to have the legitimating effect were performed; and if the child is an adopted
or legitimated child by that law, his status as such
in another state for the purposes
will be
of inheritance of property in that state."
Utah is now bound to the rule that the personal law
of the state of domicile prevails in determining status in
lPgitirna ti on.

Popp v. Roth, 9 Utah 2d 96, 338 P.2d 123 (1959), involved a Utah adoption where the man claiming as the
natural father of the adopted child sought a habeas corpus
writ, claiming that the child had been legitimated by him
by his acknowledgirnmt and marriage of the mother of
the child in Illinois under the provisions of Chapter 3,
Par. 12, Illinois Revised Statides 1969 (then Chapter 3,
Sec. 163, Illinois Revised Statides 1953). The Utah court
held that the status of the child as an illegitimate subject
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to adoption in Utah should be determined by examining
the acts for legitimation of the father under the Illinois
law, which was the personal law of status for the child
and the father, as both were domiciled in Illinois at the
time of the acts. The Utah court found that the father
was not finally divorced at the time of his marriage to the
mother in Illinois, that thus a married man cannot enter
into a valid marriage with a woman not his wife, tha!
there was no legitimation under the Illinois law, and that
the effect in Illinois was honored and binding in Utah.
Respondent submits that Utah in the Popp case has
already determined that legitimation is a matter of
status to be determined by the law of the state of domicile
and has already interpreted the same Illinois statute a,1
relevant in the DuQuesne case.
1

Appellants admit (App. Br. p. 20) that 78-30-12 UCA
1953, regarding adoption by acknowledgment, applies to
Utah children and that their status should be determined
by the "well worn'' rule of domicile. The "well worn"
rule applies equally to status of legitimacy for inhert·
tance, and 74-4-10 UCA 1953 is the Utah statute for
status for inheritance by Utah children, as 78-30-12 UCA
1953 is for Utah adoption. (Appellants' brief, p. 20, mis·
takenly refers to 78-30-4 UCA 1953.)
1

The rule of personal law of status by the law of
domicile of the parties is a rnle necessary for order and
fairness in the law. The Forney case, supra, at 186 P.
679, pointed out that illegitimates should not be allowed
to shop around the fifty states for legitimation and

19
to find that status by going to a liberal state where coincidentally a collateral relative of a putative father has
a probate estate.
POINT III
74-4-10 UCA 1953 GIVES NO RIGHT OF INHERITANCE

TO ILLEGITIMATE COLLATERAL KIN.

This Court will determine which collateral kin of
Albert DuQuesne inherit his Utah estate. This is not a
probate of either the estate of Eugenia, decedent's illegitimate half-sister, or of Eugene, her father. The Appellants as children and representatives of Eugenia have
only such rights of succession as Utah law gives to illegitimates by statute. The Utah cases, Rohwer v. District Court and Mansfield v. Neff, both supra, clearly
limited rights of inheritance to those specifically granted
by statute.

74-4-10 UCA 1953 grants succession to illegitimates
as follows:
"Every illegitimate child is an heir of the
person who acknowledges himself to be the father
of such child, and in all cases is an heir of his
mother; and inherits his or her estate, in whole
or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner
as if he had been born in lawful wedlock." (Emphasis ours.)

74-4-10 UCA 1953 clearly dire0ts inheritance by a
child from his mother's or f.ather's estate. The purpose
of the statute was to take the illegitimate child out of the
conunon law category of f Z:Ziiis nuUius and to give order
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following the chaos, uncertainty and inequities of polr
gamous marriage times in Utah. The statute granted
inheritance, limited as it says, to the Utah illegitimate
child from its mother and from the Utah father who
timates the Utah child.
Statutes of inheritance for illegitimates in the fift)
states vary all of the way from the filius nulliiis concept
to the statutes of Arizona and Oregon, which remove all
restriction of inheritance of illegitimates and make proven
paternity the only requisite. For example, Arizona Revised Statutes, Section 14-206 provides:
1

"B. Every child shall inherit from its natural parents and from their kindred heir, lineal
and collateral, in the same manner as children
born in lawful wedlock."
Oregon Revised Statutes, Section 111.220 provided until
1957 that an illegitimate child was the heir of his mother,
but that the child was not entitled to inherit or receive
as representing his mother, any property of the
or collateral kindred of the mother. Oregon Laws 1951,
Chapter 411, p. 572, did away with all restrictions on in·
heritance, providing:
"Sec. 1. The legal status and legal relation·
ships and the rights and obligations between a
person and his descendants, and between a person
and his parents, their descendants and kindred, are
the same for all persons, whether or not the par·
en ts have been married.''

1

It is the legislative prerogative as to the extent of
and persons entitled to inheritance by illegitimates.
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Appellants' brief (p. 23) cites Blethyn v. Bidder, 80
F. Supp. 962 (D.C. Colo. 1948); In re Klingamain's Estate, 128 A. 2d 311 (Del. 1957); and Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co. v. Hodgkin, 48 R.I. 459, 137 A. 381 (1927), as
cases allowing illegitimates to inherit from legitimate
brothers and sisters. In the Blethyn and Klingaman
cases, specific statutes directed such inheritance through
the mother. The Hodgkin case involved interpretation
of "child" in a will case.
Section 237 ( 2) Comment ( e), A.L.I. Restatement of
Law of Conflicts (2nd Ed.), Vol. 2, p. 45, states:

"Distinction between statutes governing inheritance and statutes governing legitimacy.
Statutes providing a process by which an
illegitimate person is made capable of inheritance
have sometimes been classified by the courts as
statutes governing succession, or as statutes governing legitimacy, or as statutes governing both
succession and legitimacy. If the statute is classified as one governing succession, it will be applied
to provide for the inheritance upon intestacy of
interests in land within the state of enactment by
illegitimate persons who qualify under its terms.
If the statute is classified as one governing legitimacy, it will be applied to make a person legi·timate if the state of enactment is the state which
has the most significant relationship to the person
and his varent under the circumstances stated in
St•ction 287. If the statute is classified as governing lioth sncression and legitimacy, it will be appliNl to legitimatP artain persons and at the same
tinw will he a1Jplied to provide for the inheritance
by certain illPgitimate persons of interest in land
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loca:ted within the state of its enactment" (E!Uphasis ours.)
·
Section 287, Id., Vol. 2, p. 254, above ref erred to,
provides:

"Law Governing Legitimacy.
(1) Whether a child is legitimate is deter.
mined by the local law of the state which, wi\11
respect to the particular issue, has the most sig.
nificant relationship to the child and the parent
(2) The child will
be held legitima!1·
if this would be his status under the local law ot
the state where either (a) the parent was domi.
ciled when the child's status of legitimacy is claimed to have been created or (b) the child was donliciled when the parent acknowledged the child ai
his own."

If 74-4-10UCA1953 is to be construed as a succession
statute it must be limited to allow the illegitima'te chi\U
to inherit his mother's estate, or his father's estate if lit
is legitimated by the father. It cannot be strained to bt
a statute of inheritance for any illegitimate collateral kin
Such collateral kin, as Appellants are in DuQitesne, must
take in Utah under 74-4-10UCA1953 through the mother
or be legitimated under their own status law of domicile
CONCLUSION
Judge Hall should be affirmed in his decision that

1. 74-4-10 UCA 1953 is the statute for legitimation
for inheritance of Utah domiciled illegitimates.
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2. 'I1he status law of Illinois should detennine the
legitimacy of Eugenia, the illegitimate half-sister.
3. 74-4-10 UCA 1953 gives no right of succession to
Appellants, who claim through illegitimate collateral kin.
4. Appellants are not legal heirs of Albert DuQuesne. The class of first cousins, represented by Respondent, are his legal heirs.
Respectfully submitted
JAMES W. BIDLESS
1011 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

